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L
ike SARS, Ebola, and other 
emerging infectious diseases, 
antibiotic resistance in bacteria 
may have a zoonotic origin [1]. 
Evidence suggests that antibiotic use 
in agriculture has contributed to 
antibiotic resistance in the pathogenic 
bacteria of humans, but the chain from 
cause to effect is long and complicated. 
Antibiotic use clearly selects for 
antibiotic resistance, but how far 
do these effects extend beyond the 
population where antibiotics are used? 
Antibiotics and antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria (ARB) are found in the air 
and soil around farms, in surface 
and ground water, in wild animal 
populations, and on retail meat 
and poultry [2–9]. ARB are carried 
into the kitchen on contaminated 
meat and poultry, where other foods 
are cross-contaminated because of 
common unsafe handling practices 
[10,11]. Following ingestion, bacteria 
occasionally survive the formidable but 
imperfect gastric barrier, and colonize 
the gut [12]. 
Patterns of colonization 
(asymptomatic carriage) and infection 
(symptomatic carriage) in human 
populations provide additional 
evidence that ARB occasionally move 
from animals to humans [13,14]. The 
strongest evidence comes from the 
history of the use of antibiotics for 
growth promotion in Europe. After 
ﬁ  rst Denmark and then the European 
Union banned the use of antibiotics 
for growth promotion, prevalence of 
resistant bacteria declined in farm 
animals, in retail meat and poultry, and 
within the general human population 
[8,15].
Despite the evidence linking 
bacterial antibiotic resistance on farms 
to resistance in humans, the impact 
of agricultural antibiotic use remains 
controversial [16–19] and poorly 
quantiﬁ  ed. This is partly because 
of the complex of population-level 
processes underlying the between-
species (“heterospeciﬁ  c”) and within-
species, host-to-host (“horizontal”) 
spread of ARB. To emerge as human 
pathogens, new strains of ARB must 
(1) evolve, originating from mutations 
or gene transfer; (2) spread, usually 
horizontally among humans or animals, 
but occasionally heterospeciﬁ  cally; and 
(3) cause disease.
All three of these steps are complex 
and imperfectly understood. The 
emergence of a new type of resistance 
is a highly random event, which can’t 
be predicted accurately, and may 
involve multiple steps that preclude 
perfect understanding even after the 
fact. Spread is equally complicated 
and may obscure the origins of 
resistance. In some cases, emergence 
of resistance in one bacterial species is 
a consequence of the emergence and 
spread in another species, followed 
by the transfer of resistance genes 
from one bacterial species to another. 
Because of the underlying complexity, 
mathematical models are necessary 
to develop theory—a qualitative 
understanding of the underlying 
epidemiological processes [20–25]. 
Theory helps researchers organize 
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Summary Points
• The emergence and spread of ARB 
is complex and intrinsically difﬁ  cult 
to study; mathematical models can 
help with understanding underlying 
mechanisms and guiding policy 
responses. 
• Agricultural antibiotic use may generate 
novel types of ARB that spread to the 
human population; models can help 
estimate how much additional disease 
has been caused by agricultural antibiotic 
use.
• Transmission of ARB from animal 
to human populations is particularly 
difﬁ  cult to measure, as it is the product of 
a very high exposure rate to potentially 
contaminated food, and a very low 
probability of transmission at any given 
meal.  
• Depending on the assumptions used, 
the model suggests that transmission 
from agriculture can have a greater 
impact on human populations than 
hospital transmission. 
• A comparison of patterns of 
colonization of VRE in Europe and the 
United States, which had different 
patterns of agricultural and hospital 
antibiotic use, suggests that agricultural 
antibiotic use can have important 
quantitative effects on the spread of 
resistance in the community.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0732
facts, identify missing information, 
design surveillance, and analyze data 
[26].
Horizontal Transmission
Theory clearly shows that the impact 
of agricultural antibiotic use depends 
on whether resistant bacteria have 
high, low, or intermediate horizontal 
transmission rates in human 
populations [23,24]. The rate of 
horizontal transmission among humans 
is determined by the underlying 
biology of the pathogen, medical 
antibiotic use, and hospital infection 
control, but not by agricultural 
antibiotic use [22]. On the other hand, 
a farm where multiple antibiotics are 
used routinely, universally, and in low 
quantities for growth promotion is 
likely to be an excellent environment 
for the evolution of multiple resistance 
factors, including some variants that 
might never have evolved in humans. 
Thus, even very rare transmission 
resulting from agricultural antibiotics 
may have a medical impact by 
introducing new resistant variants 
to the human population. The 
epidemiology of spread in the human 
population dictates how the impact of 
agricultural antibiotic use should be 
assessed.
Zoonotic pathogens, such as 
Campylobacter and Salmonella, are 
generally regarded as having low 
horizontal transmission rates in 
human populations. While resistance 
in zoonotic infections should be 
directly attributable to resistance in 
the zoonotic reservoir, the impact of 
agricultural antibiotic use remains 
controversial [18,27–29]. Zoonotic 
species could acquire resistance genes 
from human commensal bacteria 
during the infection process, but this 
hypothesis is difﬁ  cult to test.
For pathogens with high horizontal 
transmission rates, resistant bacteria 
will spread rapidly once they have 
emerged, and prevalence will be 
maintained at a steady state by 
horizontal transmission. Thus, the 
impact of subsequent heterospeciﬁ  c 
transmission is limited (Figure 1). 
Nevertheless, one or two heterospeciﬁ  c 
transmission events could be sufﬁ  cient 
to cause the appearance of a highly 
successful ARB genotype in humans, 
affecting the timing, nature, and extent 
of spread within the human population 
[22]. Not only are such events difﬁ  cult 
to trace, but their impact is impossible 
to measure, since there is no way to 
know what type of resistance would 
have appeared and with what temporal 
pattern, if transfers from animals had 
been prevented.
The case where horizontal human 
transmission rates are intermediate is 
particularly interesting. If each case in 
a population generates approximately 
one new case (a situation we call 
“quasi-epidemic” transmission), each 
instance of heterospeciﬁ  c transmission 
will initiate a long chain of horizontal 
transmission that eventually burns 
out. Quasi-epidemic transmission 
can amplify a relatively low amount 
of heterospeciﬁ  c transmission and 
substantially increase prevalence 
[23–25]. The effect is sustained as 
long as heterospeciﬁ  c transmission 
continues. A corollary is that banning 
agricultural antibiotic use would 
have maximal beneﬁ  ts if horizontal 
transmission is quasi-epidemic [24]. 
Moreover, the effects are most difﬁ  cult 
to estimate because both heterospeciﬁ  c 
and horizontal transmission must be 
accounted for.
These principles apply to bacteria 
associated with outpatient antibiotic use 
and community-acquired infections as 
well as those that are primarily hospital-
acquired. Although quasi-epidemic 
transmission would seem to be a 
special case, it may in fact be the rule 
for many hospital-acquired bacteria 
because it is the natural endpoint of 
the interplay between economics and 
ecology [30]. By spending money on 
hospital infection control, hospital 
administrators can reduce nosocomial 
transmission rates for resistant bacteria. 
For example, hospitals may screen and 
isolate patients who are likely to be 
carriers (i.e., active surveillance) and 
implement infection-control measures, 
but this comes at the cost of isolating 
patients [31]. Total costs are minimized 
by spending just enough to eliminate 
(or nearly eliminate) the pathogen; 
thus, quasi-epidemic transmission is the 
economic optimum [30].
The Community as a Reservoir 
for Resistance
Horizontal transmission is further 
complicated by population structure, 
such as the movement of humans 
through hospitals and long-term 
care facilities. Medical antibiotic use 
and horizontal transmission rates 
are high in hospitals, but this is 
counterbalanced by short hospital stays. 
An emerging view for hospital-acquired 
bacterial infections is that persistent 
asymptomatic carriage plays a key role 
in the epidemic of resistance. ARB can 
asymptomatically colonize a person 
for years: even if the number of other 
people infected during a single hospital 
visit is less than one, this number will 
exceed one when summed over several 
hospital visits [25,32,33]. Thus, the 
ecological reservoir of resistance in the 
community plays an important role in 
the increasing frequency of resistance 
in hospital-acquired infections.
Short hospital visits and long 
persistence times of ARB in people 
guarantee that some of the costs 
associated with failed infection control 
are passed on to other hospitals—new 
carriers are frequently discharged 
from one hospital only to be admitted 
to another hospital later [30]. Thus, 
the harm done by these ARB is borne 
by the whole human population, 
particularly all of the health-care 
institutions that serve a single 
catchment population. In economic 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020232.g001
Figure 1. The Emergence and Spread of 
Antibiotic Resistance in Bacteria with High 
Horizontal Transmission Rates 
Emergence and spread begins with a 
honeymoon period following the approval 
of a new antibiotic; the honeymoon ends 
when resistance emerges. Prevalence 
increases exponentially at ﬁ  rst, but it 
eventually approaches a steady state. The 
impact of agricultural antibiotic use must 
be assessed by comparing the observed 
situation with the counterfactual situation, 
an imaginary world in which antibiotics 
were never used in agriculture. The impact 
of agricultural antibiotic use is, then, the 
total number of cases of resistance that 
would not have happened without the 
use of antibiotics in agriculture. This is 
approximately the difference between 
the time of actual emergence and the 
counterfactual emergence, multiplied by 
the steady-state prevalence. While we don’t 
know what would have happened in any 
particular case, we can estimate the likely 
magnitude of agricultural impacts. 
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terms, the damage caused by the 
carriage of ARB is a kind of pollution.
By comparing the total number 
of new carriers generated in the 
community, the impacts of agricultural 
antibiotic use on hospitals can be 
compared directly to the impact 
hospitals have on each other (Figure 
2). The rate of heterospeciﬁ  c 
transmission is intrinsically difﬁ  cult to 
measure directly because the risk of 
exposure and colonization per meal is 
very small. Nevertheless, agricultural 
antibiotic use may generate as many 
carriers as hospitals for the simple 
reason that the population experiences 
many more meals than hospital 
discharges [34]. When agricultural and 
nosocomial transmission are equally 
rare in the population, the latter will be 
much easier to identify and quantify.
A Natural Experiment: 
Glycopeptides and Vancomycin-
Resistant Enterococci
Is the impact of agricultural antibiotic 
use on the emergence and spread 
of ARB in humans large or small 
relative to medical antibiotic use? Put 
another way, are farms or hospitals 
bigger polluters? A large-scale natural 
experiment was conducted in the 
United States and several European 
countries when each adopted different 
policies on glycopeptide use in animals 
(avoparcin) and humans (vancomycin) 
[16,17,35–37]. Many European 
countries approved avoparcin for 
animal growth promotion in the 1970s, 
but the US did not.
In the early 1980s, demand for 
vancomycin in US hospitals surged 
because of increasing aminoglycoside 
resistance among enterococci and 
methicillin resistance in Staphylococcus 
aureus. Physicians in US hospitals 
also used oral vancomycin for some 
Clostridium difﬁ  cile infections [37–39]. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
vancomycin-resistant enterococci 
(VRE) emerged and spread through 
US health-care systems. In Europe, 
hospitals used less vancomycin because 
most enterococci were sensitive to 
aminoglycosides, and oral vancomycin 
was seldom used. VRE still emerged 
and spread through European 
hospitals, but the problem has been 
less severe than in the US [40].
A different pattern emerges for 
community prevalence of VRE. VRE 
are rarely found outside of hospitals 
in the US, except for patients who 
have a prior history of hospitalization. 
Community prevalence of VRE in 
the US is typically less than 1%. In 
contrast, community prevalence of VRE 
was estimated at 2%–12% in Europe 
during the late 1990s, including 
carriage by people with no history of 
hospitalization [17,41–48]. In other 
words, the European community 
reservoir generated by vancomycin 
use in hospitals and avoparcin use in 
agriculture was apparently much larger 
than the US community reservoir 
generated only by vancomycin use in 
hospitals.
The prevalence of VRE in the 
community declined after the EU 
banned avoparcin [15]. Thus, 
avoparcin is at least partly responsible 
for the reservoir of VRE in the 
European community, but how much 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020232.g002
Figure 2. How Large Is the Impact of Antibiotic Use in Agriculture? 
Comparing the amount of antibiotics used in agriculture with the amount used in medicine 
means comparing fundamentally different things because they affect the emergence of 
medically important antibiotic resistance in different ways. For hospital-acquired infections, it 
is more appropriate to think about ARB carriage in the community as a kind of pollution that 
ﬂ  ows into hospitals. Thus, the appropriate way to measure impact is by counting how many 
new carriers are added to the community reservoir from hospital discharges versus from 
exposure to bacteria that originate on farms. Different formulas describe these processes.
To count ARB carriers among hospital discharges, let x denote the proportion of 
patients from a hospital (or other institution) that are colonized on discharge. In some 
discharged patients, resistant bacteria clear quickly, but a fraction, p, become ARB carriers. 
Some proportion of patients were already carriers at the time of admission, denoted by k.
Institutions vary by size, H, and average length of stay (1/s). Thus, the rate that new carriers 
are discharged from a hospital is given by the formula: sH( px − k ). This formula measures the 
contribution of a hospital to the number of ARB carriers in the community.
For example, a hospital with 400 ﬁ  lled beds (H = 400 people) serves a US population of 
about 250,000 people. With a ﬁ  ve-day average length of stay (the discharge rate is s = 0.2 per 
patient per day), the hospital discharges about 80 patients each day. If we suppose that 20% 
of patients acquire resistant bacteria while hospitalized, and one in four of these patients 
become carriers (px − k = 0.05), a hospital would discharge about four persistently colonized 
people per day—about 1,460 carriers after one year, or approximately 0.58% of its catchment 
population.
A different formula characterizes heterospeciﬁ  c transmission, following exposure to ARB 
on contaminated food. We let g denote the daily per-capita rate that ARB are ingested with 
a meal. Similarly, we let h denote the proportion of those ARB populations that survive 
the gastric barrier and persistently colonize. The number of new carriers generated in the 
community by agricultural antibiotic use in a population of size N is: ghN. For example, if the 
average person consumes some ARB in 1% of meals (g = 0.03 per person per day), followed 
by colonization with probability one in 2,000 (h = 0.0005), agricultural antibiotic use would 
generate about four new carriers per day in a population of 250,000 people, N, approximately 
the same number as a hospital.
The formulas illustrate a general principle:  “A large number of people exposed to a small 
risk may generate many more cases than a small number exposed to a high risk” [34].
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of that reservoir came from avoparcin 
and how much came from hospitals? 
To weigh the impact, we subtract the 
community prevalence of VRE in 
the US (<1%) from the community 
prevalence of VRE in Europe (>2%). 
The remainder (>1%) is attributed 
to avoparcin. This analysis probably 
underestimates the real impact because 
vancomycin was used less in European 
than in US hospitals. Thus, avoparcin 
use in Europe would appear to be 
responsible for generating a larger 
reservoir of VRE in the community 
than US hospitals. Put another way, the 
impact of avoparcin use on European 
hospitals was larger than the impact of 
US hospitals on one another.
Conclusion
Despite the evidence that avoparcin 
use has had a large impact on the 
emergence and spread of VRE by 
increasing the reservoir of VRE in the 
EU, some uncertainty continues to 
surround the clinical signiﬁ  cance of 
VRE strains of animal origin and of 
the zoonotic origins of resistance in 
general. Bacterial strains circulating 
in hospitalized populations may 
be genetically distinct from those 
circulating in the general human 
population [13,17,49]. Thus, bacterial 
populations are some combination 
of zoonotic, quasi-epidemic, and 
epidemic strains. The complexity 
of bacterial population biology and 
genetics makes it practically impossible 
to trace bacteria (or resistance factors) 
from the farm to the hospital, or to 
directly attribute some fraction of new 
infections to agricultural antibiotic use. 
Asymptomatic carriage of resistance 
factors by nonfocal commensal bacteria 
adds to a general risk of resistance, but 
transfer of resistance among bacterial 
species is unpredictable and difﬁ  cult 
to quantify. Until more evidence is 
available, it is prudent and reasonable 
to consider bacteria with resistance 
genes a general threat [50–52].
Some part of the controversy over 
agricultural antibiotic use has been 
a disagreement about how to weigh 
evidence and make decisions when 
the underlying biological processes 
are complex. In this case, the effects 
of agricultural antibiotic use on 
human health remain uncertain, 
despite extensive investigation, and 
the effects may be unknowable, 
unprovable, or immeasurable by the 
empirical standards of experimental 
biology. What should be done when 
complexity makes an important public-
health effect intrinsically difﬁ  cult to 
measure? What is an appropriate “null 
hypothesis” or its equivalent? Should 
the same standards of proof be used 
in science and science-based policy? 
Where should the burden of proof fall?
Scientiﬁ  c assessments for policy 
should summarize the best state of the 
science, recognizing that the burdens 
and standards of proof are necessarily 
softer because of the uncertainty that 
is introduced by biological complexity. 
The best decisions weigh the evidence 
in light of the inherent uncertainty. 
The EU banned the use of antibiotics 
for growth promotion, based on the 
precautionary principle. The use 
of the precautionary principle was 
criticized by some as unscientiﬁ  c in 
this context. In fact, the intrinsic 
problem of knowability, posed by the 
biological complexity of the problem, 
makes the use of precautionary 
decision making particularly suitable 
in this arena. The assumption that 
plausible dangers are negligible, even 
when it is known that such dangers are 
constitutively very difﬁ  cult to measure, 
may be more unscientiﬁ  c than the use 
of precaution.  
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